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NOTES

The Rule 2019 Battle
WHEN HEDGE FUNDS COLLIDE
WITH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 imposes
certain disclosure requirements on committees representing
more than one creditor or equity security holder in Chapter 9
and Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases.1 It is “part of the disclosure
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code and is designed to foster the
goal of reorganization plans which deal fairly with creditors
and which are arrived at openly.”2 The Rule seeks to provide
complete disclosure to all parties involved in bankruptcy cases,
prevent conflicts of interest, and promote overall fairness in the
reorganization process.3 Although the disclosure requirements
of Rule 2019 have existed in bankruptcy reorganization
proceedings for nearly seventy years, they had been virtually
ignored until hedge funds began to actively participate in
bankruptcy cases.4
Hedge funds have become major participants in
bankruptcy proceedings, in which they often form unofficial

1

FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 2019.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 15th ed. 2007).
3
Id.
4
Menachem O. Zelmanovitz & Matthew W. Olsen, Rule 2019: A Long
Neglected Rule of Disclosure Gains Increasing Prominence in Bankruptcy, http://
www.morganlewis.com/pubs/Restructuring_Newsletter_Summer20071.pdf (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008) (“Recent divergent decisions of two bankruptcy courts have catapulted a
largely ignored rule of procedure into the forefront of issues concerning hedge fund
participation in bankruptcy cases.”).
2
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or ad hoc committees.5 These ad hoc committees share the
expenses of participating in bankruptcy cases by hiring legal
counsel and other professionals to represent them throughout
the process.6 By acting as a group, they are also able to exert
greater influence and increase their leverage, since together
they control a greater percentage of the company’s claims.7
While this arrangement is especially beneficial to hedge funds,
it raises unique disclosure issues.8 These disclosure issues have
been the subject of two recent bankruptcy court decisions
involving ad hoc committees and the application of Rule 2019.9
In February 2007, in In re Northwest Airlines Corp.,
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York held that an ad hoc committee failed to fulfill
the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 and ordered the
committee to file a modified 2019 statement.10 Pursuant to
the Rule’s requirements, the court required each member of the
committee to disclose the amounts of claims and interests
owned, when the claims and interests were acquired, the
amounts paid for the claims and interests, and any sales of the
claims and interests.11 The committee then filed a motion
requesting the court to permit the additional Rule 2019
statement to be filed under seal. The court denied the motion.12
Conversely, in April 2007, in In re Scotia Development LLC
(“Scopac”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas denied a similar motion to compel
an ad hoc committee to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019.13 The judge in that case decided that the
5
Eric B. Fisher, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of Corporate
Bankruptcy Practice, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2007).
6
Id. at 87.
7
Id. (“[S]uch committees offer similarly-situated creditors an avenue to
increase their leverage within the bankruptcy case and to share legal and other
expenses. Ad hoc committees are particularly effective when their members hold a
blocking position with respect to a class of claims.”).
8
Id. at 88.
9
See generally In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest I), 363 B.R. 701
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Northwest Airlines Corp. (Northwest II), 363 B.R. 704
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Scotia Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL
2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007).
10
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704.
11
Id. at 702 (“The Rule requires disclosure of ‘the amounts of claims or
interests owned by the members of the committee, the times when acquired, the
amounts paid therefor, and any sales or other disposition thereof.’ The [committee’s]
statement . . . fails to disclose this information and is insufficient on its face.”).
12
Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 705.
13
In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1.
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ad hoc committee was not a committee for the purposes of
Rule 2019.14
This Note focuses on whether ad hoc committees
comprised of hedge funds or private equity firms should be
required to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule
2019. It argues that Rule 2019 in its current form was enacted
to address abuses by protective committees in the 1930s, and
does not contemplate the types of investors or committees that
exist today. Further, if required to comply with the current
Rule 2019, investors like hedge funds and private equity firms
will likely stop trading in distressed claims, which would be
inefficient for the market for distressed securities. However,
while efficiency is important to the financial markets,
transparency is important to bankruptcy cases, and a proper
balance must be struck to address these competing interests.
Therefore, Rule 2019 should be amended to facilitate market
efficiency while still allowing for disclosure of the information
that is necessary to administer a bankruptcy case.
Part I of this Note explores the background of hedge
funds and their role in bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the
history, requirements, and purpose of Rule 2019. Part II
evaluates the recent bankruptcy decisions of Northwest and
Scopac. Part III discusses the importance of disclosure and
transparency to bankruptcy proceedings, as well as the
implications of disclosure on the liquidity in the distressed
securities market. Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to
Rule 2019 that will strike a balance between the competing
interests discussed in Part III. The solution will only require
disclosure of the information necessary for successful reorganizations, without having the effect of shutting down claims
trading and decreasing the liquidity of the distressed claims
market.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Hedge Funds: Friend or Foe?

A hedge fund is “an investment vehicle that pools
capital from a number of investors and invests in securities and
other instruments.”15 They are customarily private investment
14

Id. at 2.
THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS:
REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 1:1 (2007).
15
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funds, open to only a limited number of investors.16 This selfimposed restriction is extremely beneficial because it allows
hedge funds to be lightly regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and other regulatory agencies.17
Unlike heavily regulated mutual funds, which are subject to
numerous disclosure requirements, hedge funds typically do
not have to disclose their investment activities to third
parties.18 They have become notorious for their secrecy and do
not want the public knowing “who their investors are, what
they invest in, what they pay for their investments, or, more
importantly, what their return is on their investments.”19 This
secrecy is particularly important to hedge funds because it
allows them to protect their investment strategies and prevent
others from duplicating their trading models.20 While hedge
funds were originally designed to use their leverage and short
selling strategies to hedge their position in equity trading
markets, many funds today have a wide variety of investment
strategies and techniques.21 Of particular significance to this
Note is that in recent years many hedge funds have in fact
become very active in the market for distressed securities.22
Distressed securities are the securities of companies
that are in “severe economic distress, possibly facing bankruptcy, reorganization, or otherwise involved in restructurings
16

Id.
See id. Hedge funds are only available to accredited investors, and are not
sold to the general public. As a result, hedge funds are exempt from certain
registration requirements under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Id.; see also
Paul F. Roye, Remarks at the Global Challenge in Investment Management Regulatory
and Legal Issues, Apr. 19, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch552.htm (last
visited Mar. 23, 2008) (noting two major exemptions under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 for funds with less than 100 investors and funds where the investors are
“qualified purchasers”).
18
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge
Funds and Funds of Hedge Funds, http://sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Apr.
10, 2008).
19
Seymour Roberts, Jr. & Joe Wielebinski, When Worlds Collide: The Clash
Between Hedge Funds and the Bankruptcy Code, May 21, 2007, at 1,
http://www.munsch.com/publication.cfm?publication_id=178 (follow “View Document”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
20
Hedge funds “use a combination of market philosophies and analytical
techniques to develop financial models that identify and evaluate market opportunities. Very often, the financial models are very sophisticated, highly quantitative
and proprietary to the fund.” Thomas G. Evans et al., Hedge Fund Investing, J.
ACCOUNTANCY ONLINE, http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/feb2005/evans.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2008).
21
Mark Berman & Jo Ann J. Brighton, Hedge Funds: Lessons Learned from
the Radnor Decision, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2007).
22
Id.
17
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or recapitalizations.”23 Many hedge funds buy bonds, loans, or
equity of these companies at deep discounts hoping to profit
from the market’s lack of understanding of the value of these
investments.24 They are able to purchase these securities at a
discount due to the companies’ financial trouble.25 In addition,
many banks and institutional investors are forced to sell such
risky securities that tend to decrease the value of their
investment portfolios.26 Hedge funds pursue these investments
hoping to earn above-market returns, and, as a result, have
become increasingly active in corporate bankruptcy proceedings.27 More and more, hedge funds are purchasing distressed
securities in companies only if they think they can influence
the bankruptcy proceedings, and if they think they can gain
high returns on their investment.28
Some believe that hedge funds’ involvement in bankruptcy proceedings is extremely beneficial to the reorganization
process because it leads to “more competitive financing terms
and increased liquidity in the debt markets.”29 They are also
particularly useful in the restructuring process because they
can make different types of investments (debt and equity) in a
single company.30 Additionally, their exemption from traditional regulation allows them to quickly adapt their investment
strategies to the situation at hand.31
While some investors, commentators, and companies
value their participation in corporate bankruptcy, hedge funds
also have their critics. As owners of debt in a company, they
can influence the restructuring process and have a significant
say in that company’s future.32 They are able to influence the
23

LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Fisher, supra note 5, at 24.
28
Id.
29
See id.; see also Timothy F. Geithner, Hedge Funds and Derivatives and
Their Implications for the Financial System, Remarks at the Distinguished Lecture
2006, sponsored by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Hong Kong Association of
Banks, Hong Kong (Sept. 15, 2006), transcript available at www.newyorkfed.org/
newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060914.html) (last visited Mar. 23, 2008) (“In most
circumstances, increased trading and participation contributes to market liquidity and
makes markets less volatile. The ultimate benefit should be lower risks for all market
participants.”).
30
Berman, supra note 21, at 30.
31
Id.
32
Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A1 (“[H]edge funds have also grown prominent in corporate
24

1416

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4

bankruptcy case and protect their interests because as a
committee, they have standing to be heard on any issue
involved in the proceedings.33 This is troubling to some because
hedge funds tend to have short-term investment objectives and
may own both debt and equity in the same company, leaving
them with seemingly conflicting priorities.34 The lack of any
strict regulatory oversight over their activities also contributes
to the general negative perception of hedge funds in the
industry.35
B.

The Bankruptcy Code and Rule 2019

It has been said that the “three most important words in
the bankruptcy system are: disclose, disclose, disclose.”36 In
fact, transparency is “one of the hallmarks of the bankruptcy
process,” which is illustrated by a number of provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code including Rule 2019 disclosures.37 Disclosure
by the debtor allows creditors to assess the financial affairs of
the company and decide whether a proposed plan of
reorganization is feasible and in their best interests.38 On the
other hand, disclosure by creditor committees, like those
required by Rule 2019, allows the debtor and other parties
involved in the case to understand with whom they are
negotiating and who will be voting on the reorganization plan.39
Historically, bankruptcy was generally meant to be an open

bankruptcies, where they can make a cheap bet on a company’s recovery by buying its
debt. By owning the debt, they can become powerful creditors and serve on committees
that have a large say in the future of a company.”).
33
John D. Ayer et al., What Every Unsecured Creditor Should Know About
Chapter 11, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, 40 (2004).
34
Anderson, supra note 32, at A1.
35
Id.
36
In re Sanchez, 372 B.R. 289, 305 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007).
37
Michael P. Richman & Jill L. Murch, The Importance of Full Disclosure in
Seeking Success Fees Under §328(a), 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 87 (2007). (Other
examples of transparency are the debtor’s schedules and the 341 meeting.)
38
Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy
and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1213, 1248
(1994); see also Harvey L. Tepner, Common Sense, Nonsense and Higher Authorities:
The Need for Improved Chapter 11 Financial Disclosures, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 36, 37
(2003) (“Proper financial disclosure by debtors enables creditors and other parties to
make decisions based on information rather than rumor, speculation or supposition.”).
39
Mark Berman, Will the Sunlight of Disclosure Chill Hedge Funds, 26 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 24, 64 (May 2007) (“[I]f committee members want the benefit of
collective participation [in bankruptcy cases], they must accept a fiduciary obligation to
the class and disclosure rules must be complied with.”).
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arena where all parties could work together and come to a
mutually beneficial decision.40
Compliance with Rule 2019 requires the filing of a
verified statement containing the following information: (1) the
name and address of each creditor or equity security holder; (2)
the nature and amount of the claim or interest and the time of
acquisition if it was acquired within a year of the filing of
the petition; (3) the facts and circumstances in connection with
the employment of the representative filing the statement,
and, for committees, the names of the entities who employed or
organized the committees; and (4) the amounts of claims or
interests owned by the representatives or committee members,
the times they were acquired, the prices paid, and any
subsequent sales of the claims or interests.41 Additionally, if
there are material changes to the information presented in the
original disclosure statement, the Rule requires that a supplemental statement be filed to update the information.42 If an
entity or committee fails to comply with these requirements,
the Rule sets out sanctions that may be imposed.43 Among
other forms of relief, a court may prohibit those entities or
committees that fail to comply from further participation in the
bankruptcy proceedings.44
Rule 2019 covers entities and committees that act in a
fiduciary capacity but are not otherwise controlled by the
court.45 This specifically excludes official committees that are
required to be organized under other provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.46 Official committees are exempt from the
disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 because they are
otherwise “subject to direct court oversight in a variety of
ways.”47

40

Adam H. Kurland, Debtors’ Prism: Immunity for Bankrupts Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Part I), 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 177, 179 (1981) (“Full
disclosure of all relevant information has always been an important policy of the
bankruptcy laws . . . .”).
41
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, § 2019.02.
46
Id.
47
Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4. “Among other things, official
committees are appointed by the United States Trustee and must seek bankruptcy
court authorization to retain professionals and court approval of their professional fees
and expenses. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102, 327, 328, 330.” Id. at note 9.
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The original purpose of Rule 2019 can be traced back
almost seventy years to an influential study conducted by
William O. Douglas48 for the SEC in the 1930s.49 Douglas held
public hearings for fifteen months, calling hundreds of witnesses who testified about inside groups working with
bankrupt companies to take advantage of creditors. The investigation uncovered “[i]nside arrangements, unfair committee
representation, lack of oversight, and outright fraud [that]
often cheated investors in financially troubled or bankrupt
companies out of their investments.”50 The final report, entitled
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities,
Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization
Committees (“Douglas Report”), “centered on abuses by
unofficial committees in corporate reorganizations and equity
receiverships.”51 The unofficial committees addressed in the
report, unlike the committees that exist today, were referred
to as protective committees. These committees were often
sponsored by the debtor and solicited deposit agreements from
individual creditors that granted control over the claims to the
committees.52 Douglas viewed the members of these protective
committees as fiduciaries that owed “exclusive loyalty to the
class of investors they represent[ed]” because the deposit
agreements were irrevocable and transferred all powers from
the owner of the claim to the committee.53 Based on his
investigation, Douglas explained that many of these
committees frequently violated that fiduciary duty to the
depositor in two ways: (1) conflict of interests and (2) the
exercise of excessive powers by committee members.54 As will
48
William O. Douglas later served as a Supreme Court Justice from April 17,
1939 to November 12, 1975. With a term lasting thirty-six years and seven months, he
is the longest-serving justice in the history of the Court.
49
Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
50
Douglas and the Protective Committee Investigation: Implementing the
Power of the SEC through Investigative Hearings and Legislative Recommendations,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/douglas/protectiveCommittee.php (last
visited Mar. 23, 2008).
51
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704.
52
William O. Douglas, Statement before Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/
papers/1930/1937_0608_Douglas_ProtCom.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
53
Id.
54
With respect to conflicts of interests, Douglas pointed to several examples,
including committees dominated by management and investment bankers, bondholders
serving on stockholders’ committees and vice versa, and committee members serving
their own individual interests. He pointed to a hypothetical case where some
committee members may have acquired their securities at very low prices, and others
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be discussed in this Note, while the protective committees that
Douglas investigated are unlike the committees that exist
today, some of these examples of abuses are still relevant
today.55
Douglas concluded that existing laws were not sufficient
and that “public investors needed protection from insiders in
reorganization cases.”56 Douglas made several recommendations to Congress based on the evidence he presented. One of
the recommendations was that any person who represents
more than twelve creditors or stockholders (including committees) appearing in the bankruptcy cases be required to file a
sworn statement that included the following: the amount of
securities or claims owned by the investor being represented,
the dates of acquisition, the amount paid for the securities
or claims, and any subsequent sale or transfer.57 This
recommendation led to the adoption of Chapter X of the former
Bankruptcy Act,58 which became Rule 10-211 under the 1978
Bankruptcy Code and later Rule 2019.59 Though many changes
were made to the provisions affecting reorganizations, the
drafters of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code retained the substance of
the original Rule in the current Rule 2019.60 In fact, in the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, it was
stated that “[t]he Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws is of
may have acquired their securities at or near to par value. These instances would
create an automatic conflict of interest since the committee members who purchased at
low prices may want to agree to a settlement that would be of economic harm to those
who purchased at or near to par. He said that “[o]ut of such circumstances are serious
conflicts of interest born.” Id.
With respect to the exercise of excessive powers by committee members,
Douglas pointed to numerous examples, including committee members trading the
securities of a corporation undergoing reorganization based on inside information,
committees fixing their own fees without supervision, committees paying solicitors to
use “high pressure” tactics to get investors to deposit their securities, and one-sided
deposit agreements giving control of the investors’ securities to the committee and
immunizing the committee from responsibility. Id.
55
See infra Part IV.
56
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 30 (1995).
57
William O. Douglas, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work,
Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees
(1937), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1937_0510_
SEC_003.pdf.
58
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was significantly amended by the 1938
Chandler Act, which added, among other things, the predecessor to the current
Chapter 11 provisions that govern corporate reorganization. This was replaced by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, also known as the Bankruptcy Code.
59
Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701, 704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
60
Id.
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the opinion that the conclusions and recommendations of the
protective committee study and the Congressional policy
embodied in the Chandler Act61 are still valid.”62 While some of
the conclusions of the study are certainly relevant today, it is
clear that this Rule was enacted to specifically address abuses
by protective committees in the 1930s that solicited deposit
agreements from investors. This Note argues that over the
years, the nature of unofficial committees changed significantly
and Rule 2019 was never amended to meet the needs of the
changing marketplace.
Though some claim that there is relatively little case
law applying Rule 2019, there have been many cases where the
Rule has been applied.63 However, there are very few cases
applying the Rule to unofficial or ad hoc committees.64 The
existing case law provides some evidence that when courts
have applied the Rule, it was to ensure the overall fairness and
integrity of the bankruptcy process.65 However, prior to the
Northwest decision, no unofficial or ad hoc committees had
been required to file disclosure statements in accordance with
Rule 2019.66 Typically, the legal counsel or law firms hired by
committee members got away with filing a verified statement
that disclosed the names of the committee members and the
aggregate equity or debt holdings that the committee represented.67
Until Northwest, hedge funds in particular had participated in bankruptcy proceedings for many years without being
subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019. They have
61

See supra note 58 (describing the Chandler Act).
Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, at 247 (1973).
63
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704 (“Although the Committee argues that the
Rule has been frequently ignored or watered down, there is no shortage of cases
applying it.”).
64
Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4 (noting that the majority of cases
applying Rule 2019 have involved law firms representing class action plaintiffs against
the debtor’s estate). The court’s main concern was whether the lawyer had the
authority to represent the class. Id.
65
See In re Congoleum Corp, 321 B.R. 147, 167 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005)
(ordering disclosure under Rule 2019 “to prevent conflicts of interest among Creditors’
counsel from undermining the fairness of the Plan, bringing to bear the values of good
faith and fairness in the reorganization process that pervade the bankruptcy code”); In
re Oklahoma P.A.C. First Limited Partnership, 122 B.R. 387 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1990)
(ordering compliance with Rule 2019 because the attorney represented conflicting
interests in the case where the debtor filed for bankruptcy and the same law firm
represented all creditors).
66
Zelmanovitz & Olsen, supra note 4.
67
Id.
62
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often done so as members of ad hoc committees, since they are
especially resistant to disclosing internal financial and trading
information to debtors or the general public.68
II.

NORTHWEST AND SCOPAC: RULE 2019 EMERGES

The court in Northwest received the attention of everyone in the bankruptcy industry when it applied Rule 2019
on its face to require ad hoc committees to disclose their
trading information. It sent a strong message to industry
experts, distressed companies, investors, creditors, and—most
importantly—hedge funds. Scopac came on the heels of the
Northwest decision, and once again drew the attention of
everyone in the industry, when that court appeared to ignore
the plain meaning of the Rule and refused to require disclosure
because of the effects it would have on the claims-trading
market. Clearly, the Scopac decision is at odds with Northwest
and has added another piece to the already complicated Rule
2019 puzzle. Hedge funds celebrated a small victory, but the
decision left everyone wondering how future cases would be
decided. This Part explores the courts’ decisions and reasoning
in both cases. It argues that the Northwest court properly
interpreted the Rule, as Rule 2019 on its face clearly applies
to ad hoc committees. However, the Scopac court correctly
recognized the tension that is created when Rule 2019 is
applied on its face, which forced the court to ignore the plain
meaning of the Rule. This Part therefore concludes that while
Rule 2019 in its current form does apply to ad hoc committees,
it is unequipped to address the needs of the financial marketplace and serve the changing dynamics of bankruptcy cases
today.
A.

In Re Northwest Airlines: Debtors Win Round I

Northwest Airlines filed a voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in September 2005, and the trustee appointed a
statutory committee of unsecured creditors.69 In November

68

See supra Part I.A.
Debtors’ Objection to Motion of the Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an Order
(A) Pursuant to Sections 105(a) and 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9018 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy
Rule 2019(a) Statement Under Seal, (B) Limiting the Disclosure Required in Their
Rule 2019 Statement and (C) Granting a Temporary Stay Pending Determination of
69
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2006, news broke that U.S. Airways had made a bid to acquire
Delta Air Lines out of its bankruptcy proceedings.70 This caused
speculation about consolidation in the airline industry, and
within a week, Northwest’s stock rose nearly 300%.71 This
prompted a group of investors who regularly invest in
distressed companies to purchase some of Northwest’s common
stock.72 Over the next couple of months, these investors sought
the appointment of an official committee based on the
contention that the increased share price was evidence of
Northwest’s solvency.73 In response, the U.S. Trustee declined
to appoint an official committee.74 These investors then formed
an ad hoc committee, and in January 2007, they filed a notice
of appearance in the case.75 The law firm representing the
committee filed a verified statement pursuant to Rule 2019,
which included the names of the eleven committee members,
the aggregate amount of common stock and claims owned by
the committee members, and a statement that some of the
claims were acquired after the commencement of the bankruptcy case.76
In February 2007, Northwest filed a motion seeking,
among other things, an order compelling the ad hoc committee
to file an amended 2019 statement disclosing more detailed
information on the amounts of claims owned by each committee
member, when these claims were acquired, the amount paid for
these claims, and any subsequent sale of these claims.77 The ad

This Motion at 4, Northwest I., 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930)
[hereinafter Northwest Debtors Objection].
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 4-5.
73
Id. at 5. The investors argued that the increase in Northwest’s stock price
as well as general speculation about industry consolidation were evidence that
Northwest was solvent and there was value for the equity holders. Id. The debtors
opposed the motion, arguing that an increase in the trading price of their securities
was not indicative of reorganization value. Id.
74
Id. at 6. The U.S. Trustee declined the motion because the ad hoc
committee “failed to demonstrate both the likelihood of a meaningful recovery for
equity holders in these cases, and that a separate committee was necessary for their
adequate representation.” Id.
75
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 701.
76
Id. at 701-02.
77
Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 7. Northwest argued that
the ad hoc committee sought to make an impact at a late stage in the reorganization,
yet the committee’s true purpose remained a mystery because it did not disclose its
individual holdings. Therefore, Northwest asked the court to prohibit the committee
from further participating in the case unless it made proper disclosure. Posting of Bob
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hoc committee opposed the motion, arguing that its 2019
statement was sufficient.78
1. The Court’s Decision
On February 26, 2007, Judge Allan Gropper of the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of New York decided in favor of Northwest that the ad hoc
committee had failed to fulfill the disclosure requirements of
Rule 2019.79 He ordered the committee to file a modified 2019
statement within three business days, concluding that “the
Rule is long-standing, and there is no basis for failure to apply
it as written.”80 The court’s reasoning was twofold. It first
addressed the committee’s substantive argument against
disclosure and then looked to the history and purpose of Rule
2019.
The ad hoc committee argued that the Rule on its face
applied only to “every entity or committee representing more
than one creditor or equity security holder” and that since no
committee member represented any party other than itself,
Rule 2019 did not apply.81 In addition, only the law firm
represented more than one creditor, but since the firm did not
have any claims in Northwest, it had nothing to disclose.82 The
court held that this interpretation of Rule 2019 by the ad hoc
committee was flawed, stating succinctly that “the Rule cannot
be so blithely avoided.”83 It pointed out that the law firm’s
clients appeared as a committee, filed a notice of appearance in
the case as a committee, moved for the appointment of an
official committee, and had been litigating discovery issues
collectively.84 Additionally, the court noted that the committee
retained a firm to represent it, that it compensated the firm for
the work done on its behalf, and that the firm represented the

Eisenbach, In the (Red): The Business Bankruptcy Blog, http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/
2007/03/ (Mar. 4, 2007).
78
Eisenbach, supra note 77 (noting that the committee stated that the
purpose of the Rule was only to ensure that reorganization plans were negotiated and
voted on by those authorized to act for the real parties in interest, and that purpose
was satisfied by its statement).
79
Northwest I, 363 B.R. at 704.
80
Id. at 704.
81
Id. at 703.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.

1424

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4

interests of the committee collectively, not the interests of
individual committee members.85
After responding to the committee’s substantive argument, Judge Gropper then looked to the history and purpose of
Rule 2019 with regards to the role of ad hoc committees.86 He
pointed out that by appearing as a committee, the members
speak as a group and “implicitly ask the court and other parties
to give their positions a degree of credibility.”87 The court also
cited the Douglas Report, which focused on abuses by unofficial
committees, and accordingly led to the adoption of disclosure
requirements under the current Rule 2019.88
The court therefore ordered the ad hoc committee to
comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019 and file
an amended statement within three business days.89 Specifically, the court required each member of the committee to
provide the amounts of claims and interests owned, when the
claims and interests were acquired, the amounts paid for the
claims and interests, and any sales of the claims and interests.
2. A Frenzy of Filings: The Committee Seeks Privacy,
Northwest Seeks Disclosure
Following Judge Gropper’s ruling, both the ad hoc committee and Northwest made a series of motions and filings.90

85
Id. Judge Gropper also distinguished this case from others where a law
firm might represent individual clients, and as such the firm would be the only party
required to file a disclosure statement under Rule 2019. He pointed out that this was
not the case with the ad hoc committee who, based on the facts, clearly formed a group
and retained counsel to represent the collective interests of that group. Consequently,
the committee fell under the plain meaning of Rule 2019, and was required to provide
the information required for each of the individual committee members. Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. The court also noted that because the Bankruptcy Code provides the
possibility of giving compensation to unofficial committees, disclosure is important. Id.
88
Id. at 704.
89
Id.
90
This case drew the attention of many in the industry, and there were also
motions from the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and
Bloomberg News, who wanted to weigh in on the court’s decision. See generally
Objection of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors to Ad Hoc Equity Committee’s Motion for an Order Granting Leave to File Its Rule 2019(a) Statement Under
Seal, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Northwest Official Committee Objection];
Response of the United States Trustee to Motion of Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an
Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105(a) and 107(b) and Rule 9018 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a)
Statement Under Seal, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter U.S. Trustee Motion];
Memorandum of Law by Bloomberg News in Support of Intervention and in Opposition
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Essentially, the committee sought to retain the private
investment information of its members, and Northwest sought
disclosure of the information that had been ordered by the
court under Rule 2019.
The ad hoc committee first filed a motion for an order
allowing the additional Rule 2019 statement to be filed under
seal because it constituted confidential commercial information
and trade secrets as contemplated by Section 107(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code.91 The committee argued that hedge funds
trade using complex and proprietary strategies and maintain
strict confidentiality over their trading practices.92 Thus, the
information required under Rule 2019 would prejudice the
committee members if not filed with the court under seal.93 The
ad hoc committee also argued that requiring public disclosure
of confidential information would have a “chilling effect” on
future creditor participation in bankruptcy proceedings94 and
discourage investors such as themselves from trading in
distressed securities on the secondary market.95
to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Request for an Order Sealing Its Rule 2019(a) Disclosures,
Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Bloomberg Motion to Intervene].
91
Section 107(b) provides in pertinent part that “[o]n request of a party in
interest, the bankruptcy court shall, and on the bankruptcy court’s own motion, the
bankruptcy court may—protect an entity with respect to a trade secret or confidential
research, development, or commercial information . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
92
Motion of the Ad Hoc Equity Committee for an Order (A) Pursuant to
Sections 105(a) and 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9018 of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure Granting Leave to File Its Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a)
Statement Under Seal, and (B) Granting a Temporary Stay Pending Determination of
This Motion at 6, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 [hereinafter Northwest Ad Hoc Committee
Motion].
93
Id. at 6-7. In support of this proposition, the committee relied on prior
cases that held that information relating to the trading of securities was confidential,
proprietary and did not have to be disclosed. See, e.g., Fed. Open Market Comm. of Fed.
Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 363 (1978) (holding that the committee did not
have to disclose commercial information including the buying and selling of securities
on the open market), cited in Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at
6-7. The committee also argued that such relief was not discretionary, but required by
the Code if the court determined that the information fell under Section 107(b). See,
e.g., In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 191
B.R. 675, 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995); In re Handy Andy Home Improvement Centers,
Inc., 199 B.R. 376, 381 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
94
Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 10-11. They noted
that the information required is highly confidential and the committee members do not
even share it among themselves. Only counsel has access to the information. Id.
95
Id. at 11-12. The committee also attempted to convince the court that it
should not compel the individual committee members to submit the information
required by Rule 2019, but rather that the committee should be allowed to submit
aggregate information. In support of this alternative, the committee pointed to the time
and expense that would be incurred to gather this type of detailed information for a
significant number of trades. The committee argued that the level of detail ordered by

1426

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4

Northwest quickly objected to the ad hoc committee’s
motion to file the information under seal. It refuted the
committee’s assertion that the information ordered by the court
was a trade secret or proprietary information under Section
107(b).96 Northwest maintained that the information was
merely historical, factual information, not trading models or
strategies.97 In support of its argument, Northwest pointed out
that current SEC regulations require disclosure of this information “as part of the fundamental premise that transparency
promotes fair and efficient markets and market practices.”98 It
equated this regulation to Rule 2019’s purpose in a bankruptcy
setting.99 Additionally, Northwest noted that Owl Creek Asset
Management, one of the leading members of the ad hoc
committee, had voluntarily disclosed the information required
by Rule 2019, yet there had been no contention that it had
suffered any harm or prejudice as a result of its public
disclosures.100
The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors also
objected to the ad hoc committee’s motion. It argued that
allowing the information to be filed under seal would defeat the
underlying purpose of Rule 2019.101 It claimed that the fact that
the Code’s drafters required the information to be disclosed
under the Rule is evidence that the information is not a
confidential trade secret that should be protected.102 The official
committee also pointed out that Section 107(b) has never been
the court would not add anything substantive to the proceedings, and noted that the
price paid for the shares had no effect on the committee members’ rights. Id. at 14-16.
96
Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 14.
97
Id.
98
For example, Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
requires investors who acquire five percent or more of a class of registered equity
securities to file a statement. Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 15.
99
Id. Northwest further contended that the cases cited by the ad hoc
committee all involved confidential agreements, not historical trading information like
the case at hand. Id. at 16.
100
Id. at 18-19. Northwest also objected to the aggregate information solution
proposed by the ad hoc committee. It argued that this was insufficient under Rule
2019, and the complete, individualized information previously ordered was essential for
the reorganization proceedings to continue. Id. at 11. Northwest also stressed the
importance of public disclosure of the information and asked the court to deny the
motion to file under seal. It argued that allowing the ad hoc committee to circumvent
detailed disclosure to all parties would defeat the essential purpose behind Rule 2019
of complete disclosure during the reorganization process. Id.
101
Northwest Official Committee Objection, supra note 90, at 1-2. The
committee argued that “disclosure is not complete if the “disclosed” information
remains under seal.” Id. at 4.
102
Id. at 5.
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used to allow Rule 2019 disclosures to be filed under seal.103
Furthermore, it argued that the ad hoc committee had not
proven the existence of “an extraordinary circumstance or
compelling need” that is required for a seal request to be
granted.104
Bloomberg News105 also moved to intervene so that it
could ensure that the public had access to all the information
regarding the bankruptcy proceedings.106 It also opposed the ad
hoc committee’s motion to seal, pointing to the importance of
transparency in bankruptcy proceedings, the presumption of
public access mandated by Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code,
and the constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings
and court documents.107
The U.S. Trustee108 also weighed in prior to the court’s
decision, filing a response to the ad hoc committee’s motion. It
argued that the committee’s aggregate claims solution was
insufficient to satisfy Rule 2019.109 It also noted that public
access to court documents is favored in bankruptcy cases and
that the denial of public access was only appropriate in very
limited circumstances, which were not met in this case.110

103

Id.
See In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that “a
judge must carefully and skeptically review sealing requests to insure that there really
is an extraordinary circumstance of compelling need.”). Like Northwest, the official
committee also pointed out that Owl Creek had already publicly disclosed the same
information even though it was not required to do so under any SEC regulation.
Northwest Official Committee Objection, supra note 90, at 6-7.
105
Bloomberg is currently the largest leading financial news and data
company in the world. It reports on political, legal, financial and business events
worldwide.
106
Bloomberg Motion to Intervene, supra note 90, at 1. The motion was “an
effort to ensure that the public has a full and accurate understanding of the events
occurring in this Chapter 11 proceeding, including the motivations and interests of the
players who seek to control an important public company.” Id.
107
Bloomberg argued that there was a strong public interest in the role that
hedge funds play in the financing of distressed companies, which could not be ignored.
Bloomberg also noted that while hedge funds have become an important part of the
U.S. economy, they have also been largely unregulated, and the public (including
current and former employees of Northwest) had a critical interest in learning about
the role that these funds would play in the reorganization of Northwest. Bloomberg
ultimately stressed the importance of the disclosure, and the public harm that would
result if the Rule 2019 statement were filed under seal. Id. at 2-3.
108
The U.S. trustee is responsible for overseeing the administration of
bankruptcy cases and private trustees. 28 U.S.C. § 586 (2000).
109
U.S. Trustee Motion, supra note 90, at 6.
110
Id. at 6-9. The Trustee also concluded that before the court could order a
seal, the ad hoc committee had to prove that the trading information constituted
strategies that were confidential information or trade secrets, and that the public
104
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3. The Court Decides Again: Disclosure Trumps Privacy
After consideration of the parties’ motions and a hearing
on the issue, Judge Gropper issued his ruling denying the ad
hoc committee’s motion to file the disclosure statement under
seal.111 The court rejected the argument that the committee
members’ trading practices constituted commercial information
under Section 107(b).112 It concluded that the committee’s
contention that the information would allow its competitors to
determine its trading strategies was unfounded.113 Additionally,
the court pointed out that the Douglas Report considered the
importance of public disclosure in drafting Rule 2019, which is
inconsistent with filing the information under seal.114
The court was especially critical of the fact that the
committee members chose to act as a group to gain leverage in
the reorganization proceedings, while simultaneously pointing
to the possibility of individual financial losses that they may
incur by revealing the information.115 Nevertheless, it concluded
that even if the committee members had valid individual
interests in keeping the information private, Congress had
subordinated those interests to those advanced by Rule 2019.116
For example, Rule 2019 is designed to protect equity holders
who are not members of any committee and who rely on the
disclosures to understand the motivations of the committee
members.117 The court concluded that even if the ad hoc
committee did not accept a fiduciary responsibility to the other
shareholders, the purpose of Rule 2019 was to provide those
shareholders with sufficient information so that they could
decipher whether that committee would advance their
interests, or whether they should form their own committee.118
disclosure already made by Owl Creek did not remove them from the protection of
Section 107(b). Id.
111
Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
112
Id. at 706-07.
113
Id. at 707. In fact, the court noted that at oral argument counsel agreed
that the “trading strategies” of his clients were not at issue. Id.
114
Id. at 708. The Douglas Report stated that the information required by the
rule would “provide a routine method of advising the court and all parties of interest of
the actual economic interest of all persons participating in the proceedings.” Id.
115
Id. The court pointed out that by acting as a group, the committee
members “subordinated to the requirements of Rule 2019 their interest in keeping
private the prices at which they individually purchased or sold the Debtor’s securities.”
Id.
116
Id. at 709.
117
Id.
118
Id.
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Overall, the disclosures also would allow all parties involved in
the reorganization to assess the credibility of a group that
would ultimately play an important role in the case.119
The court pointed to two facts in the current case that
emphasized the importance of Rule 2019 disclosures to the
other shareholders.120 First, the ad hoc committee had already
“disclosed that committee members own[ed] a very significant
amount of [Northwest’s] debt, as well as stock.”121 The court
concluded that shareholders had a right to know whether the
debt and stock were purchased concurrently, which would raise
issues about conflicts of interest.122 Second, three committee
members had already admitted that they might sell their stock
at any time, which would potentially leave other similarly
situated shareholders without representation.123 The court
noted that one function of Rule 2019 is to provide other
members in a class “the right to know where their champions
are coming from.”124
After the court’s ruling denying the seal, three hedge
funds that were members of the ad hoc committee filed a
motion for reconsideration of the court’s initial decision.125 The
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (“LSTA”), and the
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”) filed a brief in support of the motion arguing that
the court’s decision would discourage many sophisticated
stakeholders from participating in future bankruptcy cases.126
The court denied this motion. Nine of the thirteen members of
the ad hoc committee later complied with the court’s order and
119

Id.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. Based on these facts, the court concluded that “[g]ranting the motion to
seal would scuttle the Rule.” Id.
125
Motion of Certain Equity Holders, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), FED. R.
CIV. P. 59(e) and 60(b), and L.R. Bankr. P. 9023-1(a) for Reconsideration of
Memorandum of Opinion and Order Granting Debtors’ Motion for an Order Compelling
Ad Hoc Committee to File a Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a),
at 1, Northwest I, 363 B.R. 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930).
126
Joinder of Loan Syndications and Trading Association and Securities
Industry and Financial Markets Association As Amici Curiae to Motion of Certain
Equity Holders, Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) and 60bB), and
L.R. Bankr. P. 9023-1(a) for Reconsideration of Memorandum of Opinion and Order
Granting Debtors’ Motion for an Order Compelling Ad Hoc Committee to File a
Verified Statement Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), at 3, Northwest I, 363 B.R.
701.
120
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filed an amended statement providing the amount of stock they
held, when the stock was purchased, and the amounts paid.127
The remaining four members presumably dropped out of the
case.
B.

In Re Scotia Development LLC: Hedge Funds Win
Round II

In January 2007, Scotia Pacific filed a voluntary
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.128
The ad hoc committee in Scopac (referred to as the “Noteholder
Group”) was present from the beginning of the bankruptcy
proceedings, and in February 2007, it filed a statement
pursuant to Rule 2019.129 The equity held by the committee
consisted of “timber notes,” which were traded publicly, but
were secured obligations of Scopac.130 The statement filed by
the committee included the names of the committee members
and their aggregate note holdings, which totaled 90%.131 Like
the original Rule 2019 statement in Northwest, it did not
include detailed information about each committee member’s
holdings, when they were acquired, or the price paid for the
holdings.
1. Scopac and the Noteholder Group Disagree
In March 2007, not long after the final ruling in
Northwest, Scopac filed a motion for an order compelling the ad
hoc committee to disclose all the information required under
Rule 2019(a).132 Scopac argued that Rule 2019 applied to the
127
Verified Amended Statement of the Ad Hoc Committee of Equity Security
Holders Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a), at 2, Exhibit A, Northwest I, 363 B.R.
701.
128
Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 3, In re
Scotia Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18,
2007) [hereinafter Scopac Debtor’s Motion].
129
Id. at 3, 7.
130
Id. at 4.
131
Verified Statement of Bingham McCutchen LLP and Gardere Wynne
Sewell LLP Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 at 1-2, In re Scotia Development, 2007
WL 2726902.
132
Scopac Debtor’s Motion, supra note 128, at 1. Scopac noted in its motion
that while the committee claimed to currently represent 90% of the outstanding timber
notes in its initial statement, at various times it also stated that it represented 97%
and 99% of the notes, but no revised statement was ever received. Id.
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committee since it admittedly represented the majority of note
holders.133 It relied heavily on the recent Northwest decision,
including the court’s conclusion about the history and purpose
of Rule 2019.134 In addition, Scopac argued that unless the
committee fully complied with the requirements of Rule
2019(a), the court should prohibit it from further participation
in the proceedings.135
The Noteholder Group objected to Scopac’s motion,
arguing that Rule 2019 did not apply to it for four reasons:
(1) it was not a committee; (2) it did not represent any creditors
or equity security holders; (3) it did not have any instrument;
and (4) it was not empowered to act on behalf of creditors.136
The Noteholder Group then addressed the purpose of Rule
2019. It pointed to the Douglas Report137 and argued that it was
meant to apply to protective committees that were organized
and controlled by the debtor and other inside groups.138 It
concluded that the term “committee” in Rule 2019 applied only
to committees that were fiduciaries, and had the authority to
bind the creditors they represented.139 Furthermore, it pointed
out that nothing suggested that the Rule should apply to
informal groups like theirs, which sought merely to share
expenses, speak collectively and only represent the interests
133

Id. at 8-9.
See supra Part II.A.
135
Scopac Debtor’s Motion, supra note 128, at 11.
136
First, the Noteholder Group examined the legal definition of a “committee”
and argued that it was merely a group, not a committee, since it was self-elected and
did not speak for anyone other than itself. As a group, it argued that it was not a
committee within the meaning of Rule 2019. Second, the Noteholder Group argued that
it did not represent more than one creditor or equity security holder as required by
Rule 2019. Again it looked to the legal definition of representative, which means
someone who represents or has the authority to act for someone else. It pointed out
that the members of the group did not represent anyone other than themselves. Third,
the Noteholder Group argued that there was no instrument or agreement that specified
the group’s authority to act on behalf of the note holders. Noteholder Group’s Objection
to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for an Order Compelling the ad Hoc
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 1-13, In re
Scotia Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr.
18, 2007) [hereinafter Noteholder Group Objection].
137
See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text (discussing the Douglas
Report).
138
The Noteholder Group noted that in the post-Depression era, these
protective committees often solicited deposit agreements from small investors, who as a
result gave up control in the proceedings. Thus, Congress adopted the Rule because it
wanted to control abusive behavior by protective committees, who were fiduciaries to
the investors they represented. Noteholder Group Objection, supra note 136, at 13-14.
139
Id. at 16.
134
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of the members in the group.140 The Noteholder Group also
criticized Northwest, arguing that the court incorrectly interpreted the meaning of Rule 2019.141
Scopac filed a response to the Noteholder Group’s objection, arguing that the plain language of the Rule applied.142 It
pointed out that the group was in fact very similar to the
ad hoc committee in Northwest because it filed a notice of
appearance as a committee, retained counsel as a committee,
compensated counsel as a committee, litigated issues in the
bankruptcy proceedings as a committee, and gave instructions
to counsel as a committee.143 Thus, Scopac concluded that the
Noteholder Group could not argue that it was not a committee
under the meaning of Rule 2019 solely to avoid disclosure.144
Scopac also responded to the Noteholder Group’s
arguments that it was not a fiduciary and no instrument
existed that governed the group. It relied on Northwest for the
proposition that a committee need not be a fiduciary to be
required to comply with Rule 2019.145 Perhaps Scopac’s
140

Id.
Id. at 17. The Noteholder Group also argued that the Northwest decision
was distinguishable in the following ways: (1) the ad hoc committee in Northwest,
unlike the Noteholder Group, initially tried to be appointed as an official committee; (2)
the Northwest committee held only 27% of the securities, but the Noteholder Group
held 95% of the timber notes; (3) some of the members of the Northwest committee
owned both stock and debt, but the members of the Noteholder Group owned nothing
but timber notes; (4) the Northwest committee sought to negotiate for the entire class of
shareholders whereas the Noteholder Group only represented themselves; (5)
Northwest was insolvent and the shareholders were fighting for recovery, but Scopac
was solvent and the note holders were entitled to full recovery; and (6) the court in
Northwest concluded that public disclosure would provide information to the other
shareholders, but the members of the Noteholder Group were the substantial majority
of the note holders. Id. at 18-20.
142
Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Response to the Noteholder Group’s
Objection to the Motion for an Order Compelling the Ad Hoc Committee to Fully
Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing a Complete and Proper Verified
Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 1-5, In re Scotia
Development LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18,
2007). Scopac pointed out that although the group had called itself a “committee” since
March 2005, it changed its title to a “group” soon after the motion seeking disclosure
under Rule 2019. Scopac argued that this naming convention was irrelevant since the
Noteholder Group never changed anything other than its name, and continued to
operate in the same way that it did since its formation. Id.
143
Id. at 1-2.
144
Id. at 2.
145
Scopac’s brief quoted the Northwest II court:
141

I’m not saying that these individual funds can’t take action in their own
interests; I’m just saying that Rule 2019 says that, if they’re a group that
wants to affect this case—and they certainly do—that they’ve got to file
certain basic information that I didn’t make up. I didn’t create the
requirement. It’s on the books, it should be filed.
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strongest argument for disclosure was that the timber notes
held by the Noteholder Group were still publicly traded.146 As a
result, if any member of the group sought to trade the timber
notes, potential purchasers should have access to the information required under Rule 2019 so that they could make
relevant decisions about the group.147
2. Friends of the Court Point Out the Implications of
Disclosure
Just as they had done in the Northwest case, the LSTA
and the SIFMA filed an amicus curiae brief opposing Scopac’s
motion. They argued that Rule 2019 disclosure would have
“detrimental impacts” on the trading markets for distressed
companies, as well as the willingness of sophisticated stakeholders to participate in corporate bankruptcy proceedings.148
They pointed out that the practical effect of compelling
disclosure is that creditors would choose to act on their own
instead of engaging in collective action, the former of which is
more efficient and cost-effective for all parties involved in the
reorganization proceedings.149
3. The Court’s Decision: This Time Privacy Trumps
Disclosure
On April 18, 2007, Judge Richard Schmidt of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas
issued an order denying Scopac’s motion to compel disclosure of
the trading information that it alleged was required under
Rule 2019.150 The order was two pages long and simply stated
Id. at 6 (quoting Transcript of Motions on March 15, 2007 at 45, Northwest II, 363 B.R.
704 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05-17930)). Scopac also argued that the absence of an
instrument did not mean that the group did not fall under the Rule, which requires
that “a verified [Rule 2019] statement include a copy of the [authorizing] instrument, if
any . . . .” Id. at 8 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019).
146
Id. at 12.
147
Id.
148
Motion of Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Loan
Syndications and Trading Association for Leave of Court Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §
1109(b) or, Alternatively, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2018(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), to Appear
as Amici Curiae, File Brief and Make Oral Argument in Support of Noteholder Group’s
Objection to Scotia Pacific Company LLC’s Motion for Order Compelling Ad Hoc
Committee to Fully Comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) by Filing Complete and
Proper Verified Statement Disclosing Its Membership and Their Interests at 2, In re
Scotia Dev. LLC, Case No. 07-20027-C-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007).
149
Id. at 12-14.
150
In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1-2.
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that the Noteholder Group was not a committee within the
meaning of Rule 2019 and therefore the disclosure requirements of the Rule did not apply.151
During the hearing on the Rule 2019 motion, Judge
Schmidt elaborated a little more on his rationale. He reasoned
that the Noteholder Group was not a committee but was
merely a group of creditors represented by a single law firm.152
He did point out, however, that there was an opportunity for
conflicts of interest to arise among the group. As such, he noted
that counsel for the Noteholder Group should ensure that
everyone understood the potential conflicts and waived them
accordingly.153
Scopac filed a motion for reconsideration shortly after
the initial denial; however, the court also denied this motion.
During the hearings held on the reconsideration motion, Judge
Schmidt noted that he made a “practical” decision: while the
information that Scopac requested was important, it was far
more important that such disclosure might negatively affect
the trading market for distressed securities.154 He also
concluded that the Northwest court’s interpretation of Rule

151

Id.
Transcript of Hearing on April 17, 2007 at 4-5, In re Scotia Dev. LLC, No.
07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007). Judge Schmidt
stated, “I’m going to take an approach, a practical approach, and find that is not a
committee, that this is—at this point that this is just one law firm representing a
bunch of creditors.”
153
Judge Schmidt stated:
152

I think that he [counsel] needs to be also careful that his, and this is just, this
is not a ruling, but I suspect that there could well be situations where his
representation of this group of people could have some conflicts of interest.
And thereby, it would be important that all of the parties that he represents
understands those conflicts in order to waive them . . . . I’m not suggesting
there are any at the present time. I’m just saying, obviously, if one of the
claimants happen to have a large unsecured claim as well as a secured claim,
there could be a conflict in the position taken with respect to—to all of his
representation.
Id. at 5.
154

Judge Schmidt stated:

I suspect technically you should file the specific amounts of the claims of each
of the—of your people you represent . . . . I know that this is one of those
things that everybody finds important. I think it’s far more important in the
sense of the impact it might have on the trading of claims and the distressed
claims market. And that’s the reason I—I made sort of a practical decision
when I made the decision.
Transcript of Hearing on May 22, 2007 at 19, In re Scotia Development, 2007 WL
2726902.
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2019 was not what the drafters intended.155 In support of this
conclusion, he noted that the Rule was enacted as a result of
the Douglas Report, and the committees that existed then were
not the same as the committees that exist today.156
This decision appears to be inconsistent with Rule 2019.
However, Judge Schmidt chose to ignore the plain meaning of
the Rule in favor of a results-oriented decision that emphasized
the effects on disclosure. Specifically, Judge Schmidt seemed
especially concerned about the implications of disclosure on
future claims trading. The next Part explores this tension
between the transparency required under the Bankruptcy Code
and the secrecy that is purportedly necessary for a functioning
marketplace.
III.

THE RULE 2019 TENSION: TRANSPARENCY V. LIQUIDITY

As the Northwest court held, Rule 2019 on its face
applies to ad hoc committees. In addition, certain disclosures
are necessary to achieve successful results in bankruptcy cases.
However, applying the Rule in its current form to require
disclosure of the complete trading history of committee
members has implications on claims trading of distressed
securities. This Part discusses the implications of the Northwest and Scopac decisions and concludes that they create a
tension between transparency and liquidity. Additionally, it
discusses and analyzes two Delaware cases that present a
“middle ground” to help resolve this tension. This discussion
will help to develop a framework for a proposed amendment to
Rule 2019 in Part IV of this Note.157
A.

The Northwest Approach: The Implications of Disclosure

The Northwest decision requires that each member of an
ad hoc committee disclose the information specified in Rule
2019. While disclosure is one of the hallmarks of the
Bankruptcy Code, and is important to successful corporate
155

Id. at 19 (“In any event, I also understand that—that this is one of those
things that—that, I mean, you can’t fault the reasoning of the New York Court. I just
don’t think that was what was intended by the statute originally.”).
156
Id. (“I think the statute went back to the old Douglass group and whatever
that—those—that group, the study of—of committees as they existed bank then, and
not committee in the sense that we talk about them now. And so what’s [sic] why I sort
of drew that line.”).
157
See infra Part IV.

1436

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:4

reorganization,158 there are two other major implications to be
considered. One is the effect that disclosure will have on
liquidity in the trading markets for distressed claims and
securities. The second is the effect that disclosure will have on
the participation of experienced stakeholders, like hedge funds,
in future bankruptcy litigation. These two implications were
discussed in amici curiae briefs filed by the LSTA and the
SIFMA in the Northwest and Scopac cases.159 Additionally, in
Scopac, Judge Schmidt noted that while the committee was
technically required to file individual disclosures, he made his
decision because of the potential impact that disclosure would
have on claims trading in the market for distressed
securities.160
1. Liquidity
One of the major arguments against requiring disclosure is that it will decrease the liquidity of the trading
markets for distressed claims. Liquidity refers to the ability to
convert claims and securities by buying and selling.161 The
trading of distressed claims is often beneficial to both the buyer
and the seller.
Buyers of distressed claims and equity seek to acquire
securities in reorganizing debtors for various reasons. Unlike
sellers, buyers view these claims as being undervalued and
seek to gain by taking a risk on the investment.162 They are
willing to purchase these claims and accept the risk because
they feel that they understand the true value and can gain
above-average returns. Many distressed investors sometimes
hold debt in the company and seek to bundle these claims with
the debt that they hold.163 Specifically, in our marketplace
today, many hedge funds have begun making direct “secondlien” loans to struggling companies and want to hedge their
investment by acquiring equity in the company.164 They may
158

See supra Part I.B.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.2.
160
See supra note 154.
161
Forbes Media, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity
.asp (last visited Mar. 23, 2008).
162
Presentation by the Loan Syndications and Trading Association Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Legal Issues and Trends Related to Claims Trading, at
6, June 14, 2007 [hereinafter LSTA Presentation] (on file with author).
163
Id.
164
LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2.
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want to influence the reorganization process by taking an
active role in the repayment plan or even by taking over the
company.165 Since sellers are eager to get rid of their claims in
light of the financial performance of the company, buyers can
often obtain the debtor’s securities at significantly discounted
prices.166 Despite the discounted prices at which they acquire
distressed claims, investors like hedge funds can offer sellers
much needed liquidity.
On the other hand, sellers of distressed claims usually
need cash immediately and cannot wait for the company to
reorganize before receiving some kind of payment.167 The
reorganization process is typically long, and it may take
holders of claims some time before they receive consideration
for their equity holdings. In fact, equity holders are unlikely to
receive anything because they are the residual claimants.
Additionally, sellers may not want to participate in the
restructuring proceedings themselves, which are expensive and
timely.168 Specifically, active participation in restructuring
cases sometimes requires significant expenses such as counsel
and litigation fees. Sellers may value liquidity when they need
money to meet their own debt obligations or to pay current
creditors or employees. The financial affairs of the company
may also lead sellers to believe that the claims they hold are
overvalued, and thus they may want to “cash out” before the
value of their investment decreases even more.169
In particular, many institutional investors like insurance companies and pension plans are forced to quickly dispose
of distressed securities because their portfolio holdings are
often subject to credit quality and rating limitations.170
Alternatively, the seller may also be a customer or supplier
who has a valuable relationship with the debtor and does not
want to jeopardize that long-term relationship by participating
in what might turn out to be an antagonistic bankruptcy
case.171 Overall, for a variety of reasons, sellers of distressed
claims want out, and they want out relatively quickly. Though
165

LSTA Presentation, supra note 162, at 6.
LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2.
167
LSTA Presentation, supra note 162, at 6.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
LEMKE ET AL., supra note 15, § 1:2.
171
Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed
Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
191, 207 (2005).
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this generally leads to a discounted selling price, sellers are
willing to accept this in light of their motivations. They value
the liquidity that distressed investors provide to the market
because it allows them to accomplish their goals.
Disclosure under the Northwest approach threatens this
liquidity because the majority of distressed investors are hedge
funds that rely on secrecy for their success.172 Hedge funds are
specifically formed in such a way as to avoid regulations that
require them to disclose how they conduct their business.173
More than anything, they seek to keep their trading information private. If forced to disclose this information, including
the price and date that they acquired their claims, it is highly
possible that hedge funds will no longer invest in distressed
claims and securities. This decrease in the trading markets will
in turn prevent holders of distressed claims from liquidating
their claims prior to the conclusion of the bankruptcy case.
2. Participation in Bankruptcy Proceedings
The second implication of disclosure is that it will
provide a disincentive for hedge funds to actively participate in
bankruptcy cases. It is important to note that hedge funds may
continue to participate but simply choose not to join ad hoc
committees. However, this may very well mean that small
hedge funds will refrain from participating altogether for fear
that they would not be able to afford the litigation costs. The
implication of disclosure on participation is therefore twofold.
First, disclosure under Rule 2019 discourages hedge
funds from forming ad hoc committees and participating
collectively in bankruptcy cases since individual creditors are
not required to comply with the Rule.174 This will lead to
inefficiencies and cause delays in the resolution of cases since
debtors will be forced to negotiate with individual creditors,
rather than with all of them as a group.175 It may seem that
individual creditors are the only ones who benefit from the
172

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
174
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019 (specifying that only “committees” or “entities”
are required to comply with the rule).
175
Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Ad Hoc Committees and the Misuse of
Rule 2019, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6 (2007). (“[T]he quickest and most effective
reorganizations are typically accomplished on a consensual basis, and debtors should
welcome the participation of a sophisticated group of creditors that collectively has
substantial voting power rather than seeking to fight those creditors at every turn.”).
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formation of ad hoc committees because they can share litigation costs and exert greater influence on the case. However,
collective participation benefits both creditors and debtors
because it prevents delays and duplication of efforts.176 In
addition, because ad hoc committees can pool their resources
to cover litigation expenses, they can retain experienced,
sophisticated professionals to negotiate with debtors. If certain
creditors are discouraged from participating in ad hoc committees and forced to act individually, they may no longer have the
financial resources to retain these professionals, who arguably
bring more expertise to the cases and help negotiate more
effective reorganization plans for both parties.
Second, disclosure discourages participation by smaller
hedge funds because of the time and expense required. One of
the reasons that creditors form ad hoc committees is in an
effort to share the litigation expenses.177 Some small investors
may not have the resources to retain counsel and incur the
litigation expenses, whereas others may simply choose not to
do so because the expense outweighs the benefit based on their
stake in the company. As a result, these creditors will
essentially have their interests restructured by larger creditors
who can afford to participate in the case. The LSTA and
SIFMA argue that this result is contrary to the broader intent
of enacting Rule 2019, which was to prevent the investors from
having their claims restructured on terms that were negotiated
by larger stakeholders, who did not adequately represent their
interests.178
B.

The Scopac Approach: The Implications of
Non-Disclosure

The Scopac decision does not require that each member
of an ad hoc committee disclose the information required by

176
Whereas debtors only had to negotiate with representatives acting on
behalf of a group of creditors, if hedge funds choose not to form ad hoc committees to
avoid disclosure, debtors will be forced to negotiate with counsel for each individual
creditor. Coordination is extremely beneficial in reorganization cases. As the Seventh
Circuit stated in another context, “coordination is especially common in bankruptcy,
which often is described as a collective proceeding among lenders.” United Airlines v.
U.S. Bank, 406 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. 2005).
177
Eisenbach, supra note 77.
178
Brief of Amici Curiae of Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association and Loan Syndications and Trading Association at 8, In re Scotia Dev.
LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2007).
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Rule 2019.179 Instead, it allows ad hoc committees to simply
file a statement identifying the members of the committee
and stating the aggregate claims held by its members.180 Prior
to the recent Rule 2019 litigation, ad hoc committees usually
provided this information on a voluntary basis.181 As discussed
in Part II.B.3, supra, the Scopac court’s decision was motivated
by the potential impact that disclosure would have on claims
trading. The LSTA and SIFMA also filed amici curiae briefs in
that case and testified during the hearings that the two main
implications of disclosure are the effects on liquidity in the
distressed securities market and participation in bankruptcy
cases. However, while these implications are important, the
Scopac decision has implications of its own. Specifically, while
liquidity is important, transparency is equally important in
bankruptcy cases in order to ensure an effective reorganization.
This Part argues that the Scopac decision does not adequately
consider the importance of transparency in bankruptcy cases.
There are two main implications of not requiring disclosure
from individual committee members. First, non-disclosure has
the potential to result in an uneven playing field for the parties
of interest in a bankruptcy case. Second, it prevents the debtor,
and other parties involved in the case, from understanding the
motivations of the ad hoc committee, exposing the debtor and
others to potential harms.
1. An Even Playing Field
An “even playing field” is where all parties involved in
bankruptcy litigation are held to the same standards. The first
potential consequence of non-disclosure is that it can create an
uneven playing field because it allows members of the ad hoc
committee to participate without meeting disclosure requirements. Transparency is the very essence of bankruptcy
proceedings, and by not holding hedge funds to this standard,
the scales are tipped in their favor. Regular participants in
bankruptcy cases have borne this burden of full disclosure in
order to reap the benefits of participation. For example, if
debtors want to reap the benefits of the automatic stay as well
as the ability to discharge their debts, they must disclose all
179

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
181
See supra Part I.B for discussion of Rule 2019 litigation prior to the
Northwest and Scopac cases.
180

2008]

THE RULE 2019 BATTLE

1441

pertinent information, including assets, liabilities, and business affairs.182 Their management is also subject to scrutiny so
that creditors can make an informed decision about their plan
of reorganization.183 If secured lenders want to reap the benefits
of debtor-in-possession lending or exit financing, court approval
is required and other creditors have an opportunity to object.184
Similarly, ad hoc committees who want to reap the benefits of
collective participation should bear the burden of complying
with the disclosure rules and accepting a fiduciary obligation to
the class that they represent.185 Under the Scopac approach, ad
hoc committees are allowed to ignore their burden of disclosure
under Rule 2019, while still reaping the benefits of participation.
2. Potential Harms to Other Parties
One party that may be harmed by non-disclosure is the
group of other creditors or equity holders in the class. For
example, in Northwest, the ad hoc committee only held about
27% of the shares in the company. The other outstanding
shareholders represented other equity holders in the class. As
discussed in Part II.A, supra, the court in Northwest was
concerned about harm to these shareholders if the ad hoc
committee was not forced to comply with Rule 2019.
Non-disclosure can harm the other shareholders in a
number of ways. First, it prevents them from being able to
assess the motivations of the committee. The dates that the
committee members purchased their claims and the price at
which they acquired them will allow the other creditors to
understand their goals in the bankruptcy case. For example,
in Northwest, it was disclosed that some of the committee
members held both debt and equity in the company.186 Rule
2019 disclosure allows shareholders to determine whether such
debt and equity claims are purchased at around the same time,
which may be evidence of a conflict of interest.187
Second, non-disclosure prevents other creditors from
making informed decisions as to whether an ad hoc committee
182
183
184
185
186
187

11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000); see also Berman, supra note 39, at 64.
Berman, supra note 39, at 64.
Id.
Id.
Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
See supra text accompanying notes 121-122.
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will adequately represent their interests or if they should form
a committee of their own. For example, if the Northwest shareholders were not aware that some of the committee members
owned both debt and equity, they may have mistakenly
believed that the ad hoc committee represented their interests
since they were in the same class.
Third, non-disclosure of subsequent sales of claims
prevents the other creditors from knowing when a committee
member is no longer involved in the case. If the committee
members are allowed to sell their claims without disclosure,
this may leave other creditors who thought that the committee
was representing their interests without representation. For
example, in Northwest it was disclosed that several members of
the committee intended to sell their claims.188 Rule 2019 would
force the committee members to disclose subsequent sales of
the claims and keep everyone informed. Non-disclosure of this
information would have allowed committee members to sell
their claims and leave the bankruptcy negotiations, which
could leave other shareholders without representation.
Another party that may be harmed by non-disclosure is
the debtor. The debtor, like other parties in a bankruptcy case,
needs to know with whom they are negotiating. The debtor
cannot effectively negotiate with the committee unless it
understands its individual members and their holdings in the
company. For example, in the Northwest case, the ad hoc
committee filed a notice of appearance and immediately began
serving document subpoenas and notices of depositions to
parties involved in the case.189 The ad hoc committee sought
specific information regarding the debtor, including valuations,
potential mergers, consolidations, and other sales involving the
debtor.190 The debtor, however, had no information about the
committee members or their holdings, which led the debtor to
file the motion requesting disclosure under Rule 2019.191
C.

The Owens Corning Approach: A Middle Ground

While the option of allowing creditors to file their Rule
2019 disclosures under seal was rejected by the Northwest
court, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
188
189
190
191

Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).
Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 7.
Id.
Id.
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Delaware was more receptive to this approach. In In re Owens
Corning, Judge Judith K. Fitzgerald was the first to institute a
procedure designed to require disclosure while still protecting
creditors’ privacy rights.192 She allowed parties to file their Rule
2019 disclosure statements privately. Information submitted to
the court was unavailable on the public docket, and a party
seeking to obtain the information had to receive the court’s permission.193 Several parties challenged the order, arguing that
they were entitled to the information under Rule 2019, that it
should have been made public, and that it was inappropriate to
require court permission for access to Rule 2019 statements.194
Judge Fitzgerald defended her order on the ground that it
adequately balanced the privacy rights of creditors with the
public’s competing interest in full disclosure.195
This identical approach was followed by the bankruptcy
court in In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp. and later upheld by the
Delaware district court.196 The parties challenging the bankruptcy court’s decision argued that the procedure unfairly
restricted their rights to access the information.197 They also
argued that it required them to incur additional expenses to
access the information disclosed under Rule 2019 since they
had to file a motion before the bankruptcy court.198 The district
court disagreed stating that the purpose of Rule 2019 was “to
ensure that plans of reorganization are negotiated and voted
upon by people who are authorized to act on behalf of the real
parties in interest.”199 Therefore, it concluded that the bankruptcy court had struck an appropriate balance between
complying with the requirements of the Rule and considering
the complexities of the case.200
These Delaware court decisions present another alternative for the current Rule 2019 conflict: filing the Rule 2019
192
Heightened Rule 2019 Disclosure Obligations for Committee Members after
Decisions in Northwest Airlines and Owens Corning, ABI COMMITTEE NEWS, Apr. 2007
(citing In re Owens Corning, No. 00-3837 (Bankr. D. Del.)).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. Judge Fitzgerald explained her ruling as follows: “This order, in my
view, does everything and probably more than it needs to do. It provides for protection
of the parties’ rights to ask us [for] this information by simply filing a motion with this
Court telling me why you want it . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
196
See In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 327 B.R. 554 (D. Del. 2005).
197
Id. at 557.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 559.
200
Id.
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disclosures with the court under seal. It is noteworthy that
these cases did not specifically allow filing under seal. The
information was removed from the electronic docket, but
parties could still obtain access by filing a motion with the
court and obtaining an order.201 However, the reasoning
employed by the court in devising this procedure is similar to
the arguments that were presented by the ad hoc committee in
the Northwest case when it sought to make its Rule 2019
disclosures under seal.202
At first glance, the approach seems to be a compromise
or a “middle ground”—the committee would be required to
comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 2019, but it
could avoid having its confidential trading information made
public. However, allowing hedge funds to file their trading
information with courts under seal is an ineffective approach
for the following three reasons. First, as discussed above, one of
the aims of the disclosure Rule is to ensure that everyone
involved in the case has access to the information. Second, the
argument that trading information constitutes “confidential
trade secrets” is unconvincing. As the debtor in Northwest
pointed out, the information required under the Rule is
historical information that is currently required under existing
SEC regulations.203 Finally, there is a valid concern that this
information should be available not only to the parties involved
in the case, but also to the public.
1. Access to the Information
The seal would allow the committee members to submit
the information required under Rule 2019 to the court, but
keep it from other parties involved in the litigation. In
Northwest, the ad hoc committee sought to make its trading
information available only to the court and the U.S. Trustee.204
The committee members wanted to keep the information from
the public, from the debtor, and from all other creditors and
equity holders.205 This simply overlooks the fact that Rule 2019
is an integral part of the disclosure scheme of the Bankruptcy

201
202
203
204
205

Id. at 560.
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 14.
Id.
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Code.206 One of the purposes of the Rule is to ensure that
reorganization plans are negotiated both openly and fairly
among all creditors.207 By not allowing all parties that are
participating in the case to have access to the information,
filing under seal seems to run contrary to this purpose of the
Rule. Disclosure is important to both the debtors so that they
can effectively negotiate with the committee, and to the other
creditors to prevent them from being harmed by conflicts of
interest. While Rule 2019(b) provides courts with discretion as
to what sanctions they can impose for noncompliance, the
requirements with respect to the information to be provided
and filing procedures under Rule 2019(a) do not allow for
discretion.208 There are no exceptions that would allow a
committee to file its information with the court under seal.
2. Trade Secrets
The ad hoc committee in Northwest argued that a sealed
2019 statement was justified because the trading information
required under Rule 2019 constituted trade secrets protected
by Section 107(b) of the Code.209 It argued that its members
trade their securities using complex strategies that comprise
proprietary, confidential, and commercial information.210 This
Note argues that the court made the correct decision in
rejecting this argument. The information to be reported under
Rule 2019 is far from complex trading strategies. It is factual,
historical trading data, including the prices and dates on which
claims were purchased and subsequently traded by the hedge
funds.211 The Rule does not seek disclosure of any hedge fund
policies, models, investment strategies, or practices. In fact,
the information required is usually available publicly for
companies that are subject to SEC regulations.212 While hedge
206
See supra Part I.B for background information about Rule 2019 and its
purpose in the Bankruptcy Code.
207
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 2, at §2019.01.
208
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019.
209
Northwest Ad Hoc Committee Motion, supra note 92, at 5-6.
210
Id.
211
Northwest Debtors Objection, supra note 69, at 14.
212
For example, Section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
requires certain disclosure for investors who obtain more than 5% of a class of publicly
traded securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2006). This and other federal securities rules and
regulations require full disclosure based on the premise that “transparency promotes
fair and efficient markets and market practices.” Northwest Debtors Objection, supra
note 69, at 15.
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funds seek to maintain their privacy and ensure they do not
fall under these regulations, these efforts do not turn this
routine trading information into proprietary trade secrets.
Additionally, bankruptcy rules, if they plainly apply, should
not be ignored to cater to a hedge fund’s preferred business
practices.
3. Public Access
Allowing an ad hoc committee to file its disclosure
statement under seal would prevent public access to the
information. When a public company files for Chapter 11
bankruptcy, other parties are affected, including employees
and pensioners. For example, in the Northwest case, the
bankruptcy proceeding affected 30,000 employees, as well as
potentially tens of thousands of other pensioners.213 Allowing
disclosure under seal would prevent these stakeholders from
understanding the motivations of a committee that could play
an important role in the restructuring of the company. In
addition, Northwest was a large, well-known airline serving
nearly 250 cities and 50 million passengers annually, and thus
what happened to the company was a matter of general public
interest.214
IV.

THE SOLUTION: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 2019

This Part proposes that Congress should amend Rule
2019 to strike a better balance between requiring adequate
disclosures in bankruptcy proceedings and maintaining hedge
fund investment in distressed claims. First, this Part argues
that while there is a need for greater consistency in Rule 2019
litigation, judges should also have some discretion to evaluate
committees based on the circumstances presented in a given
case. This can be accomplished through a combination of
outcome-determinative rules and standards.215 This Part will
use the “rules versus standards” approach in constructing a
change to Rule 2019, which will be presented in three parts:
the factors that should be considered when determining
213

Bloomberg Motion to Intervene, supra note 90, at 1-2.
Id.
215
See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric and Reality of Means-Testing,
7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105, 119 (1999) (discussing the “rules” versus “standards”
approaches as limits on judicial discretion).
214
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whether or not the Rule applies, the information that must be
disclosed under the Rule, and the sanctions that should be
imposed for noncompliance.
A.

A Delicate Balance: The Need for Consistency and the
Need for Discretion

There is a general need for “consistency and certainty”
in bankruptcy litigation.216 The Northwest and Scopac decisions
were clearly divergent and thus created uncertainty about the
future of Rule 2019 litigation. Both courts had to decide
whether or not the Rule should apply to the respective ad hoc
committees based on factors that they considered important.
This divergence is partly attributable to the fact that the
current Rule does not contemplate the nature of committees
today and partly because it does not adequately address the
various factors that should be considered in determining who
should disclose. In crafting a rule that achieves consistency, it
is necessary to allow judges some discretion. Bankruptcy
reorganization practices are constantly evolving; the recent
emergence of hedge funds as active participants in these
proceedings is an example of this. As new controversial issues
emerge, Rule 2019 must allow bankruptcy judges to exercise
discretion to give them the flexibility necessary to effectively
adapt to new circumstances.
This Note advocates an approach that both promotes
consistency and allows judges to react to developments in the
financial markets through a careful application of the “rules
versus standards approach.” Rules and standards are two
techniques that are often used to channel judicial discretion.217
The proposed solution to the Rule 2019 conflict employs a
combination of rules and standards for judges to follow when
deciding cases.
A rule mandates or guides conduct or action in a given
type of situation.218 Rules are outcome determinative and
require the decision-maker to categorize or classify issues.219
216
John W. Myers II, Bankruptcy—Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash: The
Valuation Controversy Is Over—Almost, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1025, 1039 (1998) (stating
that the Supreme Court accepted a case “because of the need for consistency and
certainty in the bankruptcy process”).
217
Williams, supra note 215, at 119 (“Rules and standards are tools for
channeling the discretion of a decision-maker.”).
218
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1331 (6th ed. 1990).
219
Williams, supra note 215, at 119.
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They “promote consistency, predictability, and judicial
restraint in decision making.”220 They effectively provide future
litigants with notice of how an issue is to be decided.221
However, rules do not allow the decision-maker to adapt the
law to special circumstances that may arise.222 They simply
require application of the law to a set of facts to produce a
result.
On the other hand, standards are indeterminate and
require the decision-maker to weigh competing interests.223
They are more flexible than rules and allow a judge more
discretion in deciding an issue.224 Allowing more discretion,
though, increases the risk of error due to bias or incompetence.225 While rules and standards each have advantages and
limitations, one or the other may be preferable in setting up a
statutory scheme, depending on the purpose of the legislative
action and the degree of decision-maker discretion that is
desirable.
In the context of Rule 2019 litigation, the best approach
would use a combination of rules and standards to promote
consistency but still allow judges to weigh different factors on a
case-by-case basis. With respect to disclosure, the current Rule
2019 takes a purely rule-based approach without the use of any
standards. The single question is whether or not Rule 2019
applies, but there are no guidelines to help a court answer this
question. This is likely because when the Rule was enacted, it
applied to protective committees, which were the only type of
committee that existed at the time.226 Currently, there are so
many participants in bankruptcy cases that committees come
in many shapes and sizes. In response, judges who believe that
a committee should not have to disclose all the information
required under the Rule simply conclude that the committee is
not covered under Rule 2019.227 How they arrive at this
220

Id. at 120.
Id.
222
Id. at 121 (“A rule is perceived as the death of thought.”).
223
Id. at 119.
224
Id. at 121.
225
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226
See supra Part I.B (discussing the Douglas Report). Protective committees
solicited deposit agreements from individual creditors and controlled their claims
during a reorganization. Id. Because of the nature of these committees and because
they were the only unofficial committees that existed at the time, there was no need for
judges to decide whether or not the Rule applied.
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For example, in Scopac, Judge Schmidt was concerned about the impact of
disclosure on the trading markets. See supra note 154. He therefore concluded that the
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decision, however, is left to their discretion. While the nature of
bankruptcy cases requires judges to have some discretion to
decide the Rule 2019 issue, there is also a need to have clear
rules for certain aspects of the decision to promote fairness and
prevent uncertainty. As such, the solution presented is a
combination of rules and standards.
B.

The Structure of the Rule

There are essentially three questions to be answered in
applying the proposed rule. First, is the particular committee
in question required to disclose under the rule? If the answer is
no, then the inquiry ends. If the answer is yes, then the second
question is: what information is that committee required to
disclose? And finally, what are the consequences or sanctions
for failure to disclose the required information?
Under this framework, the first question suggests a
“standards” approach. Since the participants and stakeholders
in bankruptcy proceedings can change at any time, the nature
of committees can also change. As such, a pure rule-based
approach would not be able to adapt to new scenarios or
complications that may arise. However, the standard will not
give judges complete discretion. Rather, it will provide several
factors that the court should consider and weigh in deciding
whether or not the committee is required to disclose.
The second and third questions are rule-based
approaches. Once the court has decided that the committee
falls under the rule and must disclose, the question of what
should be disclosed is not open for interpretation or discretion
by the court. The rule will provide for specific disclosures that
must be made. Similarly, the sanctions that should be imposed
for noncompliance are clearly stated to prevent courts from
using it as an “out.” As long as a committee is required to
disclose, and chooses not to, the court cannot excuse it from
sanctions for any reason. This is to ensure consistency and
fairness in the application of the rule, and to preserve its
integrity.

Noteholder Group was not a “committee” within the meaning of the Rule. In re Scotia
Dev. LLC, No. 07-20027-C-11, 2007 WL 2726902, at *1-2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 18,
2007).
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Question 1: Is Disclosure Necessary?

The first—and arguably most important—question is
whether or not disclosure is required by a particular committee. This decision should not be left to the complete
discretion of the judge. Instead, certain factors relating to the
circumstances of the case and the members of the committee
should be considered. The following three factors are perhaps
the most important: the aggregate holdings of the committee
members, whether the committee members hold both debt and
equity in the debtor company, and whether the claims were
acquired pre-bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. These factors
provide judges with a roadmap to guide their inquiry into
whether the committee should be required to disclose.
Though the factors are independent of each other, they
do not all have to line up for a court to decide a certain way.
The court can use its discretion to weigh each factor depending
on the circumstances of the case.228 For example, a court can
find that a committee holds 100% of a company’s stock and
acquired all of its claims pre-bankruptcy but still require
disclosure because the committee holds significant debt in the
company in addition to the stock. Similarly, a committee does
not have to meet all three factors to escape disclosure under
the rule. These factors merely guide the court through issues
that should be considered, but allows them to weigh one or two
factors more strongly when making their decision.229 While this
may lead to some inconsistency, the nature of bankruptcy
litigation calls for some flexibility in the rules.230 Without

228
This discretionary weighing can be analogized to the “Delaware Block
Approach” that is used in the corporate context to value businesses. Under this
method, the court uses three different values: values for net assets, earnings, and
market price. It gives a weight to each, and then adds them together. The weight given
to each element varies from case to case and is discretionary depending on the business
being valued. This weighing process may be outcome determinative. See Piemonte v.
New Boston Garden Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Mass. 1979).
229
This weighing technique is currently used in the “Delaware Block
Approach” where the court assigns a weight to each of the valuation techniques based
on the case before them. Id. In the Rule 2019 context, the courts would decide which
factors should be weighed more prominently based on the committee before them. For
example, if a committee held a majority of the class of claims, this would favor nondisclosure. However, this factor may be weighed less than the other two factors if the
committee purchased all their claims post-bankruptcy and owned both debt and equity
in the company.
230
The recent emergence of hedge funds as active participants in bankruptcy
litigation is an example of why flexibility is required. Rule 2019 was drafted to apply
primarily to protective committees, which are now a thing of the past. See supra Part
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allowing this discretion, the rule may end up being overinclusive or under-inclusive, and thus ineffective.231 At the very
least, this approach provides a framework for judges so that
they are all considering the same types of factors in making
their decisions. It also provides notice to investors, including
hedge funds, of what types of inquiries will be made by the
court when a Rule 2019 motion is being decided.
1. Aggregate Holdings
One of the factors that should be considered is the
aggregate holdings of the committee.232 This information would
allow the court to figure out what percentage of the total
holdings is held by the committee. If a committee holds a vast
majority of a particular class of securities, the potential for
harm to other similarly situated creditors is minimal. For
example, the ad hoc committee in Northwest held only 27% of
the outstanding stock in the debtor company, whereas in
Scopac the ad hoc committee held 95% of the timber notes.233
Comparing these two particular cases tends to oversimplify the
inquiry because 27% versus 95% is a big difference. However, if
a court had a committee that represented 60%, for example, the
inquiry is not as easy.
To provide a structure for evaluating committees based
on their investment in the debtor, this Note suggests the
following categorization. First, if a committee represents less
than 50% of the total outstanding claims or securities, the
I.B. As such, bankruptcy rules should be drafted with an appropriate balance of
achieving consistency and allowing for flexibility.
231
Without allowing judges some discretion and a clear framework for
deciding whether a particular committee should be subject to the rule, judges will
either require disclosure or ignore the rule altogether, depending on what they think
the outcome of the case should be. Judges would be in the best position to apply the
rule effectively if there were specific factors to consider and they had the discretion to
weigh each factor depending on the facts of a case.
232
This was one of the factors discussed by the Northwest court in Part II.A,
supra. This Part argues that the court was correct in considering this factor when
deciding whether or not disclosure was required.
233
See Northwest II, 363 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); Noteholder
Group Objection, supra note 136, at 1. This difference in holdings is significant for the
following reason. In Northwest, 73% of the stockholders were potentially unrepresented
in the bankruptcy case. Northwest II, 363 B.R. at 708. Allowing the ad hoc committee
to proceed without disclosure could therefore harm an extremely large percentage of
stockholders. However, in Scopac, only five percent of the note holders were not
represented by the committee. Noteholder Group Objection, supra note 136, at 1. In
that case, allowing the committee to proceed without disclosure could only potentially
harm a small percentage of the note holders.
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assumption is that they should be required to disclose. Such
a committee’s overall holdings are not a majority, and the
interests of other creditors, which represent a substantial
percentage of the outstanding claims, should be protected.
Second, if a committee represents more than 90% of the total
outstanding claims or securities, the assumption is that they
are not required to disclose. Such a committee represents an
overwhelming majority of that class of investments, and there
is a very small percentage of other creditors who may be
harmed by the committee’s actions. Finally, if a committee
represents between 50% and 90% of the outstanding claims or
securities, the court may not make any assumptions about
disclosure using this factor alone. The court should consider
the aggregate holdings in light of the other factors under this
part of the rule in making its decision. Aggregate holdings
alone will not be sufficient to either require disclosure or avoid
disclosure.
2. Debt and Equity Investments
Another factor that should be considered by the court is
whether the committee members participate in more than one
level of the debtor’s capital structure. When committee
members own both debt and equity in a company, serious
conflicts of interest issues are implicated.234 For example, if the
debt and equity were purchased around the same time, this
raises an issue about the motivations of the committee member
and warns other stakeholders accordingly. Purchasing debt
and equity concurrently suggests that the investor is solely
interested in maximizing profits. The committee may make
decisions that minimize or reduce its recovery for one type of
investment while balancing this loss by maximizing its
recovery on the other investment. This strategy will allow it to
gain overall, but will potentially harm other creditors whose
sole recovery depends on the first investment.235 The general
234
See supra Part II.A where the Northwest court also considered this factor
when making its decision. Several of the committee members admitted to owning a
significant amount of debt in the company in addition to the shares. The court
concluded that this created a conflict of interest, and the Rule 2019 disclosures were
necessary for the other creditors in the class to make decisions.
235
The Douglas Report discussed in Part I.B, supra, identified this problem,
which already existed in the 1930s. Although contemporary committees are unlike
protective committees of that era, Douglas identified problems that have implications
today. Parties that hold both debt and equity in the same company have inherent
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idea is that inherent conflicts exist when committee members
have alternate interests or motivations that can affect the
other members of the class.
Unlike the aggregate holdings factor, this factor is a
bright-line issue and does not require a judge’s discretion. The
inquiry is a simple one: committee members either own both
debt and equity or they do not. If they own both debt and
equity, the court should favor disclosure, but if they do not own
both debt and equity, the court should favor non-disclosure. As
discussed previously, this factor is only one in a series that will
be considered collectively. It does not operate independently in
the overall question of whether disclosure is required. For
instance, a committee may own both debt and equity, but own
95% of either the debt or the equity. Though the debt and
equity factor on its own favors disclosure, the court should
balance all the factors in making its decision.236
3. Pre-Bankruptcy or Post-Bankruptcy
The final factor to be considered is whether the claims
were acquired pre-bankruptcy or post-bankruptcy. The goal of
this factor is to uncover the motivations and intentions of the
committee in the bankruptcy proceedings. For example, claims
that are acquired while a company is in bankruptcy will likely
be acquired at a discounted price, whereas claims that have
been previously acquired may have been purchased at or
around face value. A committee member who has purchased a
claim for less than face value may be motivated to accept
recovery that will not fully compensate someone who has
purchased at face value.237 Understanding the timeline would
conflicts of interest, just like the bondholders who served on stockholder committees in
the 1930s.
236
For example, consider a committee that owns 95% of the outstanding stock
in a debtor company and the committee members own both debt and equity. Under the
first factor, the potential for harm to other similarly situated creditors is small. This
factor favors non-disclosure since only 5% of the class of creditors is unrepresented. On
the other hand, the second factor would favor disclosure because of the potential for
conflicts of interest among the committee members. The court would weigh these two
factors (along with the third factor discussed in the next part) to decide whether or not
disclosure is warranted. In a case like this, the court may decide that disclosure is not
warranted because although the committee members own both debt and equity, they
own 95% of the outstanding stock and there is little potential for harm to other parties.
237
See supra Part I.B. This factor was also derived from the results of the
Douglas Report. As discussed in Part I.B, Douglas was concerned about the
hypothetical case where some committee members had acquired their interests at low
prices, and others had acquired it at par value. The pre-versus-post bankruptcy
purchase will identify whether this conflict may exist and factor it into the decision.
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expose the motivations of committee members and allow other
creditors who may be harmed to protect themselves. This is
another bright-line factor. If the claims were acquired before
the case was filed, it would favor non-disclosure. However, if
the claims were acquired during the bankruptcy case, it would
favor disclosure.
4. Summary of Factors
These three factors all seek to divulge different
categories of information that will play a role in the court’s
ultimate decision: position, conflicts, and motivations. The
aggregate holdings of the committee indicate the overall
percentage of the class that it represents, and therefore its
position among the other creditors. The debt and equity
investments implicate potential conflicts of interest based on
investments in more than one tier of the debtor’s capital
structure. Finally, the pre-bankruptcy versus post-bankruptcy
issue exposes the motivations of the committee or committee
members. If taken together, these three factors should provide
the court with sufficient information to help it decide whether
disclosure is warranted.238 As stated previously, the court
should exercise its discretion in weighing these factors to reach
its decision. If the court decides that a committee should not be
subject to the disclosure rules, the inquiry ends. If the court
decides that disclosure is warranted, it moves to the second
part of the analysis.
D.

Question 2: What Information Is Required?

The second part of the analysis is a rule-based
approach. If the court decides that disclosure is warranted for a
particular committee, this section applies and the committee
members must disclose all the information required under the
rule. The court does not have the discretion to tailor the
requirements on a case-by-case basis. Thus, if a court decides

Though the dynamics of bankruptcy cases are different today, the main concern that
Douglas had was that ulterior motives, conflicts of interest and self-serving actions
would cause committees to take advantage of others. This concern is still valid today
and should be considered by the court.
238
Under the appropriate circumstances, the court may consider other factors,
not mentioned here, that are unique to a particular case. If this occurs, the court
should try to classify the additional factors into one of the three categories: position,
conflicts, or motivations.
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that disclosure is required, its discretion ends, and the Rule
controls. A committee that is required to disclose should not be
excused from disclosure regardless of any special circumstances. This is necessary for several reasons. First, Rule 2019
is the only provision in the Bankruptcy Code that courts can
use to regulate ad hoc committees.239 It is important that the
Rule be followed in its entirety to promote fairness, equality,
and integrity. Second, it will provide adequate notice to
committees that all information listed under this part of the
Rule is required, and they should be prepared to provide it if
necessary.
In presenting the information that should be required
under the proposed rule, this Part evaluates the information
that is currently required under Rule 2019 and concludes
whether or not it should remain in the rule. The first three
requirements listed below have been generally undisputed by
parties involved in bankruptcy litigation. The last four
requirements, however, have been the subject of much
controversy and debate. As will be explained in greater detail
below, this Note advocates that all information currently
required under the Rule should remain the same, except for the
price at which the claim was acquired. Under the proposed
approach, the price acquired would be removed from the
current Rule 2019 disclosure requirements.
1. Names and Addresses of Creditors
The names and addresses of the creditor or equity
security holder should continue to be required under the rule.
This information informs everyone who the parties of interest
are and their contact information. In the past, this information
has been voluntarily provided by committees participating in
bankruptcy cases and thus should not be an issue in future
litigation.
2. Nature and Amount of Each Claim
Under the current Rule, the nature and amount of the
claim must be disclosed, as well as the time of acquisition,
unless the claim was acquired more than one year prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. Again, this part of the Rule
239
See supra Part I.B (discussing how Rule 2019 fits into the Bankruptcy
Code’s overall disclosure scheme).
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has not been controversial or challenged by committees
involved in bankruptcy cases. Thus, it should remain in the
rule since it serves a valid purpose of informing the debtor and
other parties about the nature of the claims that are
represented in the case.
3. Information About the Committee
The third requirement involves disclosure of the facts
and circumstances related to the formation of the committee,
including the names of all parties that arranged formation.
This requirement has also been generally complied with in
bankruptcy cases. It should remain a part of the Rule since it
has been uncontested by committees in the past and provides
all interested parties with the important basic information of
who organized the committee and whom the committee
represents.
4. Amount of Claims Owned by Committee Members
Disclosure of the amount of claims owned by committee
members has been met with resistance from ad hoc
committees. The current Rule requires each individual
committee member to disclose the amount of claims they own.
Members of ad hoc committees prefer to, and often voluntarily,
disclose the aggregate amount of claims owned by the
committee. However, despite the opposition, this requirement
should remain a part of the Rule. While disclosure of the
aggregate amount is helpful, disclosure on an individual basis
is essential so that everyone knows who is involved and what
his stake is in the bankruptcy case.
5. The Dates Claims Were Acquired by Committee
Members
The date that the claims were acquired by the
individual committee members is the second most contested
piece of information that is currently required under the Rule.
Hedge funds in particular have argued that this information is
confidential and proprietary. They are very reluctant to make
this information public because of a fear that it will result in
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loss of leverage and that it will reveal their trading models or
strategies.240
This information should remain a part of the disclosure
requirements for the following reasons. First, the dates that
claims were acquired are not trade secrets or proprietary
information that exposes business strategies or policies.
Although hedge funds are secretive and seek to keep their
trading information private, this information is not of such a
nature that it will impact their business going forward. Hedge
funds are primarily concerned about others being able to
replicate their trading strategies.241 However, the dates on
which they acquire their claims will not likely shed any light to
outsiders about their strategy for investing. Second, this
information is helpful in bankruptcy cases so that other parties
can determine the motivations of the committee members and
identify any potential conflicts of interest. Particularly when a
committee member owns both debt and equity, the dates that
these purchases were made could expose potential conflicts.242
When the committee member’s interest in keeping the
information private is balanced against the importance of the
information in bankruptcy, the disclosure interest trumps the
privacy interest. Therefore, the dates that the claims were
acquired should remain a part of the Rule.
6. The Price Paid for the Claims by Committee
Members
The price paid by committee members for the claims
and interests they hold is undoubtedly the most controversial
disclosure requirement under Rule 2019. Hedge funds have
repeatedly objected to this requirement for the same reasons
they do not want to disclose the dates they acquired the claims.
In fact, the price and date combined is what they refer to as
confidential trading information. For example, in Northwest,
the committee specifically requested that this information be

240
See supra Part II.A.2. The ad hoc committee in Northwest argued that even
if they were required to disclose this information, they should be allowed to file it
under seal because it constituted trade secrets under § 107(b).
241
See supra Part I.A.
242
As noted in Part IV.C.2, supra, if debt and equity were purchased around
the same dates, there may be an inherent conflict of interest that other stakeholders
should be aware of.
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filed under seal because they claimed it constituted trade
secrets.243
Though this Note rejects that argument, it advocates
that the price paid should not be a disclosure requirement
under a revised Rule 2019. This is the only piece of required
information that should be removed from the current Rule. In
arriving at this conclusion, this Note balances the hedge fund’s
interest in keeping the information private against the need for
disclosure in bankruptcy. Presumably, the main reason that
hedge funds do not want to disclose the price paid for their
holdings is a loss of leverage in future trades. Since the original
purchase price would be public knowledge under the current
Rule, any potential purchasers would recognize the profit that
hedge funds stand to gain as a result of the transaction. Hedge
funds are most secretive when it comes to this pricing information, and requiring them to disclose it publicly in order to
participate in bankruptcy proceedings will have a detrimental
effect on liquidity in the distressed claims market.
On the other hand, this Note also considers the
importance of the purchase price in bankruptcy cases. The one
benefit of disclosure is that the price may reveal ulterior
motivations of hedge funds. For example, if they acquired their
claims at a very low purchase price, they may be content with a
lower recovery than others who purchased at face value.
However, this information can also be easily discerned based
on the purchase date. If the claim was acquired just before or
during bankruptcy, it was likely purchased at a discount.
More importantly, the purchase price of a claim is
not relevant in determining recovery or participation in
bankruptcy cases. Courts have consistently held that the price
paid for a claim does not have any bearing on recovery.244 A
243
244

See supra Part II.A.
The Seventh Circuit has held:

The debtor’s obligation is to pay his debts . . . . In the absence of some
equitable reason, taking the case out of the ordinary rule, the prices which
security holders pay for their securities in no wise affects the measure of
their participation in reorganization or their voting power . . . . To reduce the
participation to the amount paid for securities, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances which are not present here, would reduce the value of such
bonds to those who have them and want to sell them. This would result in
unearned, undeserved profit for the debtor, destroy or impair the sales value of
securities by abolishing the profit motive, which inspires purchasers.
In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 57-58 (7th Cir. 1945)
(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has also held:
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successful reorganization is not contingent on this information,
and thus the market need to keep this information private
outweighs the bankruptcy need to disclose it.
This Note aims to strike a balance in revising the
current Rule 2019. The goal is to ensure that the information
required in bankruptcy proceedings is disclosed without
discouraging future hedge fund investment in distressed
securities. The purchase price of the claim presents a critical
opportunity to apply this idea. The purchase price is not
something that is absolutely necessary in bankruptcy. On the
other hand, it is probably a “deal-breaker” when it comes to
hedge fund participation, since hedge funds guard this
information more closely than anything else. If forced to
disclose the purchase price, it is highly probable that they will
no longer invest in distressed claims, and the liquidity in the
market would decrease significantly.245 Therefore, this Note
proposes that the purchase price no longer be required under
the Rule. Moreover, the purchase price is likely to be used
aggressively by the debtor to discourage hedge fund participation in bankruptcy proceedings. Since it is well known by all
parties that hedge funds are extremely reluctant to provide the
purchase price, debtors may bring Rule 2019 motions requiring
disclosure as a weapon to force hedge funds out of the bankruptcy case altogether.
7. Any Subsequent Sales of Claims
Under the current Rule, any subsequent sale of claims
by individual committee members must also be disclosed. This
information is essential to bankruptcy cases and should remain
in the Rule. One of the concerns in bankruptcy is whether other
creditors may be harmed by actions of the committee. If

Analysis shows the application of such a principle would be grossly
inequitable to the holder of the secured debt. It would destroy or impair its
sales value. Buyers purchase bonds or other secured indebtedness primarily
from the profit motive . . . .He expects to realize out of the purchase more than
the purchase price, at the same time running the risk of recovering less.
Under the proposed equity, buyer, confined to the maximum of his purchase
price, buys nothing but the chance to “break even” or make a loss.
Security-First Nat’l Bank of L.A. v. Rindge Land & Navigation Co., 85 F.2d 557, 563
(9th Cir. 1936) (emphasis added).
245
For a discussion of the arguments made by the LSTA and SIFMA that
disclosure will negatively affect the claims trading markets, see supra note 126 and
Part II.B.2, supra.
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committee members were allowed to sell their claims without
disclosing the sale, creditors depending on that committee to
represent their interests would potentially be harmed. Because
there is no countervailing reason to keep this information
private, it should remain a part of the Rule.
E.

Questions 3: What Are the Sanctions for Noncompliance?

The sanctions under this section should follow a strict
rule-based approach as well. The sanctions are a key part of
Rule 2019 because they serve as a deterrent to parties who are
considering withholding information that they have been
ordered to disclose. The Rule should be clear—if a party
deliberately ignores a court’s order to disclose, it will not be
permitted to participate in the bankruptcy proceedings. The
judge must impose this sanction unless noncompliance was in
error or accidental. While this may seem harsh, it puts all
parties on notice of the consequences. If judges had more
discretion, parties may opt not to disclose and then hope to
convince the judge to impose a lesser sanction. However, this
would defeat the Rule’s purpose and defeat the purpose of
having sanctions that seek to deter noncompliance.
CONCLUSION
Rule 2019 is an important disclosure rule that had
essentially been overlooked until the Northwest and Scopac
decisions in 2007. The divergence between those decisions
raised the question of whether Rule 2019 should be applied to
ad hoc committees comprised primarily of hedge funds and
other private equity firms.
Although Rule 2019 on its face applies to ad hoc
committees, the legislative history indicates that its primary
purpose was to address abuses by protective committees in
1930s.246 Protective committees, however, are now a thing of the
past. The committees that exist today, like ad hoc committees,
are organized by creditors who seek to collectively participate
in bankruptcy cases to share costs and increase their
leverage.247 The Rule has not been changed in seventy years
and does not contemplate the types of committees or investors
that exist today. Furthermore, if required to comply with the
246
247

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.A.
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Rule, hedge funds and similar investors will likely stop trading
in distressed claims and securities, which could decrease the
liquidity in the market.
While liquidity is an important consideration, this Note
also recognizes the importance of transparency to bankruptcy
proceedings, which the Rule seeks to preserve through its
disclosure requirements.248 This creates a tension between
liquidity and transparency—while disclosure implicates a
liquidity problem, non-disclosure implicates a transparency
problem.249 Therefore, this Note concludes that Rule 2019
should be amended to address the current dynamics of Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceedings.250
Finally, this Note presents a revised Rule 2019, which
attempts to balance these competing interests.251 The goal in
crafting this revision is twofold. First, it provides a framework
for courts to use in determining whether or not a particular
committee was required to disclose. Second, it changes the
disclosure requirements to only require information that is
essential to bankruptcy and removes unnecessary disclosures
that discourage hedge fund investment in distressed securities.
Although this Note mainly addressed the issue of
whether Rule 2019 should apply to ad hoc committees
comprised of hedge funds, the proposed rule can be applied to
any ad hoc committee, regardless of whether it is made up of
hedge funds. This Note thus exposes a larger problem with
Rule 2019 and its inadequacy given the nature of bankruptcy
cases today. This may be a lesson that other bankruptcy rules
and procedures also need to be evaluated given the changing
dynamics of Chapter 11 cases.
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